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FOURTH CIRCUIT FUMBLES THE BALL:  SPIRIT 
OF DISABILITY RIGHTS COMPROMISED IN THE 
WAKE OF CLASS V. TOWSON UNIVERSITY 
Dave Peterson* 
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Class v. Towson University 
threatens the rights guaranteed to disabled persons under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(“Rehab Act”).  The Acts demand that disabled persons not be excluded 
from activities based on unsubstantiated paternalistic concerns, and, where 
exclusion occurs, the Acts entrust courts to evaluate whether exclusion was 
warranted in light of the best available objective evidence. This Comment 
argues that by deferring to the speculative fears and subjective judgment of 
Towson University—the very entity accused of violating the ADA and 
Rehab Act in Class v. Towson—the Fourth Circuit abandoned its duties and 
rendered an improper decision.  
This Comment begins with a critique of the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Class v. Towson and demonstrates that the factual record was 
devoid of evidence supporting the court’s decision to exclude Gavin 
Class—a disabled athlete—from Towson’s football team.  This Comment 
continues by arguing that the Fourth Circuit employed an incorrect 
standard of analysis when determining that Class’s disqualification did not 
violate the ADA or Rehab Act.  The conclusion of this Comment implores 
the legal community to reject the Fourth Circuit’s holding and reaffirm 
disabled persons’ right to live free from paternalistic authorities.  
 
 
                                                           
 * J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2018.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Daniel Martin and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 
editorial staff for their assistance with this article.  He also wishes to express his appreciation to 
Gavin Class, an offensive lineman whose grit is in keeping with the tradition of that most 
important position. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Comment addresses the plight of Gavin Class (“Class”), a 
Division I college football player who was excluded from National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) competition following an incident 
that left him disabled.1  The issue is whether Towson University 
(“Towson”) violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”) and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it prevented Class 
from returning to the football field.2  The District Court for the District of 
Maryland found for Class, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
in favor of Towson.3  This Comment asserts that the Fourth Circuit applied 
flawed reasoning and reached an incorrect decision.4  In finding that 
Towson was justified in excluding Class, the Court deferred to the 
“subjective good faith” judgment of Towson’s physicians rather than 
independently analyzing the facts to determine whether the university’s 
action was substantially justified and “objectively reasonable.”5  In doing 
so, the Court discounted considerable medical evidence favoring Class’ 
return and undercut the spirit of the ADA and the Rehab Act, while also 
making it impossible for disabled athletes to challenge paternalistic 
decisions denying them the right of inclusion.6  
Part II of this Comment begins with an examination of Class v. 
Towson, where the factual narrative is explored.  Part III then discusses the 
nature of a discrimination action brought under the ADA and Rehab Act.  
Part IV shows that Class should have prevailed in his claim against 
Towson.  Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing the Fourth Circuit’s 
                                                           
1. See Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015). 
2. Id. at 239. 
3. Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 837 (D. Md. 2015), rev’d, Class 806 F.3d 
236; Class, 806 F.3d at 239. 
4. See Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW 360 
(Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-to-clarify-
athlete-disability-rights [https://perma.cc/FEZ4-8SMJ]. 
5. Class, 806 F.3d at 257 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
6. Id. at 253–59 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Peter M. Spingola, Knapp v. 
Northwestern University:  The Seventh Circuit Slam Dunks the Rights of the Disabled, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV 709, 730 (1998). 
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errors and recommending how the judiciary should resolve similar cases in 
the future.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Gavin Class, a starting offensive lineman for the Division I Towson 
University Tigers football team, collapsed due to exertional heatstroke 
during a team practice in August 2013.7  The heatstroke pushed Class to the 
brink of death:  he was in a coma for nine days, suffered multi-organ 
failure, received chemotherapy, and required a liver transplant amongst 
numerous additional procedures.8  
Facing an arduous recovery, Class set out to be the first liver 
transplant recipient to play Division I college football.9  He told ESPN 
reporters, “I don’t want to give up.  I’m doing this to send a message and 
be an inspiration.”10  As a testament to his determination, Class resumed 
training with Towson’s strength coach in October 2014.  At that time, the 
university also enlisted the advisory services of specialists at the Korey 
Stringer Institute (the “Institute”)—the nation’s leading research center 
studying heatstroke and heat illness.11  After conducting a conditioning test 
in February 2015, specialists at the Institute concluded that Class was fit to 
practice in mild weather, provided that he took appropriate precautions.12  
Despite this conclusion, Towson’s Head Team Physician, Dr. Kari 
Kindschi, prohibited Class’ return because she felt that he could not safely 
return to practice or game play.13  Notably, despite being an accomplished, 
board-certified sports medicine practitioner, Kindschi had no expertise in 
heatstroke or heat-related illnesses,14 and her decision to block Class’ 
                                                           
7. Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 2015). 
8. Id. at 239. 
9. ESPN Edit Operations, Outside the Lines: Gavin Class, VIMEO (2015), 
https://vimeo.com/141587564 [http://perma.cc/N7TC-SLGV]; see Class 806 F.3d at 239, 252. 
10. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9. 
11. Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 838–39 (D. Md.), rev’d, Class, 806 F.3d 
236. 
12. Class, 806 F.3d at 240. 
13. Id. 
14. See Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 836. 
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return was based solely on the speculative fear that he would suffer repeat 
heatstroke.15  Nevertheless, according to Towson’s “Return-to-Play 
Policy,” Kindschi had the final word in determining whether a sidelined 
student-athlete could return to competition.16  Unsatisfied with this result, 
Class petitioned the federal district court for an injunction allowing him to 
fully participate in the university’s football program, alleging that 
Towson’s decision violated the ADA and the Rehab Act.17 
In June 2015, while awaiting the court’s decision, the Institute put 
Class through a rigorous fitness test in conditions that mimicked a 
summertime football practice.18  According to the Institute’s Chief 
Operating Officer, Dr. Douglas Casa,19 Class’ results were “stellar” and 
overall Class did “exceptionally well” in demonstrating his ability to 
properly thermoregulate.20  Consequently, Casa, in concert with Dr. 
William Hutson21 and Dr. Rolf Barth,22 co-directors of liver transplantation 
at the University of Maryland Medical Center, concluded that there was 
                                                           
15. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9 (“[She was] afraid that he would suffer another 
heatstroke, but [she] had no proof.  She was basing her decision on fear.  That was her exact 
words ‘I’m basing my decision on fear.’”); see Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 842. 
16. Class, 806 F.3d at 241. 
17. Id. at 242. 
18. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 840. 
19. Transcript of Record at 81–86, Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB) (Dr. 
Casa’s qualifications include having treated 185 exertional heatstrokes, authored over 175 peer-
reviewed publications and two books related to heat and hydration issues in sports, and having 
served as a “heat consultant” for the National Football League, United States military, and 
professional soccer organizations.  Dr. Casa has also conducted over forty field research studies 
and sixty lab research studies related to heatstroke and heat illness and is a Fellow of the 
American College of Sports Medicine and the National Athletic Trainers’ Association (NATA).  
In 2008, he was recognized as the “Outstanding Researcher” by the Profession of Athletic 
Training); see also Brief of Appellee at 53, Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB) (In 
2013, NATA recognized Dr. Casa as its “Most Distinguished Athletic Trainer”). 
20. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 840; ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9. 
21. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 838 (Dr. Hutson was Class’ primary physician and co-
director of liver transplantation at The University of Maryland Medical Center at The University 
of Maryland Medical Center); Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 9. 
22. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9 (Dr. Bath was co-director of liver transplantation 
at the University of Maryland Medical Center). 
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absolutely no reason why Class should not be on the field.23  The sole 
caveat to Class’ return was that Towson must monitor him as directed by 
the Institute and the University of Maryland’s transplant team.24  This 
included having an on-site team trainer track Class’ internal temperature 
during football activities through use of the CorTemp system.25  To use 
CorTemp, Class had to “ingest a small electronic device that would track 
his internal body temperature and communicate the readings through low-
frequency radio waves to a nearby handheld monitor.”26  Dr. Casa 
recommended that a team trainer take readings from the monitor by 
positioning himself or herself behind Class for three to five seconds every 
five to ten minutes during football activities.27  By executing this plan, 
Towson “could [e]nsure that Class could cease activity before he reached a 
level where he was in danger of a reoccurrence of heatstroke or heat 
illness.”28  
Still, despite the Institute having medically cleared Class, Kindschi 
held fast to her belief that allowing Class to return to the field would 
threaten his safety.29  Thus, she continued to deny him reinstatement.30  
Kindschi also claimed that implementing CorTemp was an unreasonable 
accommodation because it required team trainers to operate beyond the 
scope of their jobs,31 even though Class offered to absolve Towson of any 
and all liability.32  Speaking for Towson, Kindschi reasoned that Class was 
                                                           
23. Id. 
24. Id.; see Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 19–22. 
25. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841–42. 
26. Class, 806 F.3d at 243. 
27. Class, 806 F.3d at 243; Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841. 
28. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 840–41. 
29. See id. at 842. 
30. See id. 
31. Id. at 843. 
32. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 844 n.8 (“Nor is there any risk of increased liability for the 
University because Class has indicated that he is willing to sign a waiver before participating.”); 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21, Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No. 
1:15-cv-01544-RDB) (“Gavin has made clear to Towson that he is willing to sign a binding 
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not “otherwise qualified” to play football, and thus the university’s decision 
to exclude him from the team did not violate the ADA or the Rehab Act.33  
Following a one-day bench trial in which the medical evidence was 
considered, the district court rejected Towson’s argument and issued an 
injunction that prevented the university from excluding Class from 
competition.34  The court found that Class’ proposed accommodations, 
namely CorTemp, were reasonable and would allow him to safely return to 
competition.35  Unhappy with this result, Towson appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court in a two-to-one 
panel decision.36  The Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion noted that courts 
were “particularly ill-equipped”37 to evaluate a patient’s medical history, 
positing that the court’s job was not to “agree or disagree with Dr. 
Kindschi’s opinion or to weigh whether her evaluation [was] more 
persuasive than [the Institute’s].”38  Instead, the majority held that courts 
should defer to a university’s decision to exclude a disabled athlete where 
the decision was reached in good faith and in accordance with the 
university’s internal policies.39  Because Towson satisfied these criteria, the 
Fourth Circuit held that the university could rightfully prevent Class’ return 
to the football field.40 
                                                           
waiver of any liability on behalf of Towson in the event that he suffers another heat stroke or 
related medical issues while participating in the Towson football program.”). 
33. See Class, 806 F.3d at 243. 
34. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 851. 
35. Id. at 848; Jonathan R. Mook, Circuit Courts Address Who Is “Qualified” under the 
ADA, 2016 LAB. & EMP. EMERGING ISSUES 7426 (May 12, 2016); see Transcript of Record, 
supra note 19, at 20–21 (other non-contested accommodations included a Kevlar pad to protect 
Class’ liver and a continued regimen of immunosuppressive medications). 
36. Mook, supra note 35. 
37. Class, 806 F.3d at 251 (quoting Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horwitz, 435 
U.S. 78, 92 (1978)). 
38. Id. at 249. 
39. See id. at 247–49. 
40. Id. at 251. 
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III. EXAMINATION OF APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Purposes of the Rehab Act and the ADA 
 In seeking an injunction against Towson, Class alleged that the 
school’s decision to exclude him from the football program amounted to a 
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.41  Although these Acts apply to 
different entities, their purposes are identical, and plaintiffs frequently 
invoke them together.42  By enacting the Rehab Act, Congress sought to 
ensure that a person’s disability “in no way diminishes [that person’s] right 
to . . . enjoy self-determination; make choices; . . . and enjoy full inclusion 
and integration in the . . . social . . . [and] cultural . . . mainstream . . . .”43  
Similarly, the ADA was enacted seventeen years later “to [further] provide 
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities . . . .” 44  Taken together, 
both Acts “require[] that remote or minimal risk [to a disabled person’s 
safety] not be used to legitimize discrimination [i.e., exclusion from certain 
activities].”45  They also “prohibit[] authorities from deciding without 
significant medical support that certain activities are too risky for a 
disabled person [because] [d]ecisions of this sort cannot rest on 
paternalistic concerns.”46  
                                                           
41. Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 251 (4th Cir. 2015). 
42. See Matthew J. Mitten, Enhanced Risk of Harm to One’s Self as a Justification for 
Exclusion from Athletics, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189, 194 (1998) (citations omitted) (“A claim 
[under the ADA] requires proof of essentially the same elements as a Rehabilitation Act claim 
except that, instead of showing that the defendant receives federal funds, the athlete must prove 
that the defendant is covered by the ADA’s ‘public entity’ or ‘public accommodation’ 
provisions.”). 
43. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3). 
44. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
45. Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (N.D. Ill.), rev’d, Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 
101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); accord 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
46. Knapp 101 F.3d at 485–86; see Maureen A. Weston, The Intersection of Sports and 
Disability:  Analyzing Reasonable Accommodations for Athletes with Disabilities, 50 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 137, 163 (2005) (“The federal disability laws provide athletes with disabilities a vital 
mechanism to ensure that decisions regarding their rights to participate in athletics are 
thoughtfully considered, medically justified, and not disregarded simply upon notions of undue 
administrative burdens, false notions of competitive advantage, or paternalism.”). 
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B. Elements of a Discrimination Action Brought Under the  
ADA or Rehab Act 
To prevail on [a] claim for discrimination under the Rehab Act 
[and the ADA], [a plaintiff] must prove that:  (1) he [or she] is 
disabled as defined by the [Acts]; (2) he [or she] is otherwise 
qualified for the position sought; (3) he [or she] has been 
excluded from the position solely because of his or her 
disability; and (4) the position exists as part of a program or 
activity receiving federal financial assistance.47  
In considering the first element, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s finding that complications from Class’ heatstroke rendered 
him disabled under the Acts.48  The court also held that the third and fourth 
elements were satisfied because Towson was a public university and 
openly admitted to excluding Class from its football team solely because of 
his disability.49  That left only the second element at issue:  Was Gavin 
Class “otherwise qualified” to return to the field as a member of the 
Towson Tigers football team?50 
1. Defining What It Means to Be “Otherwise Qualified” 
A disabled person is otherwise qualified for a position if that person, 
with or without reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential 
functions of, and/or meet the essential eligibility requirements for that 
position.51  An accommodation is reasonable unless:  (1) it would impose 
undue financial or administrative burdens on the program or entity 
sponsoring the position; (2) implementation would fundamentally alter the 
                                                           
47. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 478; accord Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 845 (D. 
Md.), rev’d, Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that under the ADA (4) 
the position exists as part of a program or activity sponsored by a public entity). 
48. Class 118 F. Supp. 3d at 846; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Under the ADA, “[t]he 
definition of ‘disability’ . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . .  An 
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major 
life activity when active.”). 
49. See Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 847. 
50. Class, 806 F.3d at 239. 
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12111(8), 12131(2). 
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nature of the position; or (3) it is highly unlikely that the accommodation 
would allow the disabled person to perform the position’s essential 
functions or meet its essential eligibility requirements.52  A position’s 
functions and eligibility requirements are essential if they “bear more than 
a marginal relationship to the [position].”53  Because both criteria are 
broadly construed, courts have diverged when interpreting their meaning 
and applying their interpretations to the adjudication of disputes.54  An 
examination of the grounds for the varying interpretations is necessary to 
understand how the Fourth Circuit reached its flawed decision in Class v. 
Towson.  
a. Determining Whether a Position’s Function and/or Eligibility 
Requirements Are “Essential” 
In cases like Class v. Towson, where a disabled athlete sues for the 
right to fully participate in an athletic program, the defendant frequently 
rationalizes its exclusion decision by claiming that the athlete failed to pass 
a physical examination “essential” to certifying eligibility.55  For example, 
in Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education, a New Jersey school 
board cited a failed physical exam as justification for its decision to enforce 
the exclusion of a disabled athlete from a local high school’s wrestling 
team.56  However, the District Court for the District of New Jersey 
disagreed and held that the athlete’s disability rights had been violated.57  
The court found that, despite only having one kidney, nothing suggested 
that the disabled athlete was incapable of “pinning his adversary to the mat 
or meeting training requirements.”58  
                                                           
52. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987). 
53. Class, 806 F.3d at 246 (citations omitted); see PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 
(2001). 
54. See generally Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995); PGA Tour, 
532 U.S. 661. 
55. See generally Poole v. S. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D. N.J. 1980); 
Wright v. Colum. Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. 1387; 
Knapp, 101 F.3d 473 at 476–77. 
56. Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 953. 
57. Id. at 954. 
58. Id. at 953. 
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Instead, the record revealed that the high school excluded the disabled 
wrestler because it feared the severity of an injury to his sole remaining 
kidney.59  Acting on this fear, the school required the athlete to pass a 
physical exam constructed so that the absence of a kidney was, in and of 
itself, grounds for withholding a passing grade.60  While the court was 
sympathetic to the school’s safety concerns, it reminded the school board 
that “[l]ife has risks.  The purpose of [the Rehab Act], however, is to permit 
handicapped individuals to live life as fully as they are able, without 
paternalistic authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky for 
them.”61  To compete on the wrestling team, the disabled athlete only 
needed to demonstrate the requisite level of skill and conditioning.62  It was 
not essential that he pass an arbitrary physical exam that did not measure 
his ability to compete.63 
In PGA Tour v. Martin, the Supreme Court held that a disabled golfer 
could ride in a cart during competition.64  In so holding, the Court stated 
that the Professional Golf Association’s (PGA) mandate to walk the golf 
course was “not an essential attribute of the game [of golf] itself.”65  In a 
seven-to-two decision, the majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ assertion that walking is incidental to golf, whereas “the essence 
of [golf] has always been shotmaking.” 66  The Court reasoned that 
although the walking rule may appear to affect shotmaking by introducing 
an element of fatigue, expert medical opinion showed that any such effect 
was negligible.67 
                                                           
59. Id. at 953. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 953–54. 
62. See id. at 953. 
63. See id. at 953–54. 
64. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 663–64. 
65. Id. at 685; cf. Kuketz v. Petronelli, 821 N.E.2d 473, 479–80 (Mass. 2005) (illustrating 
a rule that is integral to a sport’s composition and holding that a disabled racquetball player’s 
request to allow two bounces before returning the ball was unreasonable because the essence of 
racquetball was hitting a moving ball before the second bounce). 
66. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683. 
67. Id. 
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Yet, despite the strong precedent set by Poole, Martin, and other such 
cases,68 “two rogue court decisions”69 stand as “outliers”70 in their 
interpretation of what constitutes an essential function or an eligibility 
requirement.71  In the first such case, Pahulu v. University of Kansas, the 
District Court for the District of Kansas stated that it was “unwilling to 
substitute its judgment” for that of the University of Kansas (KU).72  
Accordingly, it held that medical clearance by a team physician could 
remain an essential eligibility requirement at KU.73  In stark contrast to the 
process employed by the court in Martin, the Chief Judge in Pahulu did not 
evaluate medical evidence that questioned the merit of KU’s clearance 
policy.74  Instead, the court disregarded the standard of scrutiny set forth in 
Poole and determined that KU’s policy was rational and should therefore 
be upheld despite its conservative guidelines.75  
Similarly, in Knapp v. Northwestern University, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision granting Nicholas 
Knapp an injunction against Northwestern University (NU) in his quest to 
play college basketball despite suffering from a heart condition.76  As in 
Pahulu, the Seventh Circuit declined to examine whether NU’s medical 
clearance policy was marginally related to determining whether Knapp 
could fulfill the duties of an NU basketball player.77  Instead, citing Pahulu, 
                                                           
68. See generally Wright, 520 F. Supp. 789; Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 
(1979); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Why Can’t Johnny Read or Play? The Participation Rights of 
Handicapped Student-Athletes, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 163, 170–71 (1991). 
69. Eldon L. Ham, Disabled Athletes:  A Last Vestige of Court Tolerated 
Discrimination?, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 741, 741 (1998). 
70. See Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW 
360 (Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-to-
clarify-athlete-disability-rights [https://perma.cc/AE7W-YMXT]. 
71. See generally Mitten, supra note 42, at 194–204 (discussing eligibility requirements). 
72. Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1394. 
73. Id. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. 
76. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 485. 
77. Id. at 484–85. 
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it held that because NU’s policy was rationally devised, NU’s 
determination that Knapp’s failure to satisfy the university’s clearance 
policy rendered him ineligible for competition should be given deference.78  
b. Determining Whether an Accommodation Is Reasonable 
As stated earlier, an accommodation is reasonable unless:  (1) it 
would impose undue financial or administrative burdens on the program or 
entity sponsoring the position sought; (2) its implementation would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the position and/or sponsoring entity; or 
(3) it is highly unlikely that the accommodation would allow the disabled 
person to perform the position’s essential functions or meet its essential 
eligibility requirements.79  
i. Undue Financial or Administrative Burden 
To determine whether an accommodation imposes undue financial or 
administrative burdens on a sponsoring program or entity, courts must 
consider:  (1) the cost of the accommodation; (2) the overall financial 
resources of the sponsor; (3) the overall manpower of the sponsor; and (4) 
the impact of such accommodation on the sponsor’s general operation.80  
The onus is on the sponsor to prove that the proposed accommodation 
would cause such an unacceptable encumbrance, and consistent with the 
spirit of the ADA and the Rehab Act, it is very difficult for sponsors to do 
so.81  For example, football programs have been unable to successfully 
argue that testing diabetic players’ blood-sugar levels and administering 
insulin shots during competition imposes a burden substantial enough to 
render such accommodations unreasonable.82 
                                                           
78. See id. at 485. 
79. Sch. Bd., 480 U.S. at 287 n.17. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). 
81. See David Harger, Drawing the Line Between Reasonable Accommodation and Undue 
Hardship Under the Americans With Disabilities Act:  Reducing the Effect of Ambiguity on Small 
Businesses, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 783, 785–90 (1993). 
82. See generally Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 843. 
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ii.  Fundamental Alteration 
An accommodation is also unreasonable if it forces a sponsor to 
“lower or . . . effect substantial modifications [to its participation] standards 
[related to the position sought].”83  The Supreme Court endorsed this 
principle in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.84  There, a deaf 
nursing school applicant claimed that Southeastern Community College 
(SCC) violated the Rehab Act by refusing her proposed accommodation—
excusal from clinical courses.85  In considering this case, the Supreme 
Court found that SCC’s customary goal of teaching students how to 
communicate with patients could only be achieved through clinical 
learning.86  Moreover, implementation of an accommodation that devalued 
a clinical curriculum would require SCC to significantly alter standards 
central to its mission.87  Therefore, the deaf applicant’s proposed 
accommodation was unreasonable and SCC did not violate the Rehab Act 
by refusing its implementation.88   
On the other hand, in Martin, the Supreme Court held that requiring 
the PGA to allow use of a golf cart did not compel the PGA to lower or 
substantially modify its participation standards.89  The Court reasoned that 
“the use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of 
the game of golf.”90  According to the Court, “Congress intended that an 
entity like the PGA . . . carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the letter, of 
the [challenged] rule before determining that no accommodation would be 
tolerable.”91  Unlike in Davis, where clinical learning was inextricably tied 
to SCC’s standards and objectives, the “walking rule” in Martin was a mere 
                                                           
83. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 413). 
84. Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 413. 
85. Id. at 401–02. 
86. Id. at 409–10. 
87. See id. at 413. 
88. See id. at 413–14. 
89. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683–85. 
90. Id. at 683. 
91. Id. at 691. 
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formality unrelated to a golfer’s skill and not essential to the game’s 
construction.92  
The decision-making process employed by the Court in Martin 
echoed an approach previously adopted by the District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida in Johnson v. Florida High School Activities.93  In that 
case, the court sought to determine whether waiver of an age requirement 
would fundamentally alter a high school football program.94  The court 
stated that “the relationship between the age requirement and its purposes 
must be such that waiving the age requirement . . . would necessarily 
undermine the purposes of the requirement.”95  After resolving that the 
requirement’s purpose was to protect player safety and promote fair 
competition, the court considered the attributes of the waiver-seeking 
player to determine whether allowing his participation would frustrate that 
purpose.96 
The court concluded that the player was neither physically imposing 
nor exceptionally skilled, so his inclusion on the football team would 
therefore not compromise player safety or fair competition.97  
Consequently, accommodating the player by waiving age restrictions was 
reasonable and would not substantially modify the football program’s 
participation standards.98  The court’s message was clear:  “if a rule can be 
modified without doing violence to its essential purposes . . ., it [cannot] be 
‘essential’ to the nature of the program or activity to refuse to modify the 
rule.”99  
                                                           
92. Id. at 683–85. 
93. Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities, 899 F. Supp. 579, 585 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated 
as moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 585–86; see also Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *15 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 490 
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that waiving an age requirement was reasonable because the 
requirement’s purpose, to ensure safety and promote fair competition, would not be compromised 
since the petitioning athlete did not play a contact sport and was not exceptionally skilled). 
99. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 585 (quoting Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities 
Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 932–33 (8th Cir. 1994) (Arnold, R.S., dissenting)); see Weston, supra note 
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Similarly, in Wright v. Columbia University, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that waiving Columbia University’s 
(CU) medical clearance policy did not fundamentally alter the school’s 
football program.100  There, CU’s decision to exclude a disabled player was 
held to violate the Rehab Act even though the player’s lack of sight in one 
eye disqualified him under the university’s clearance policy.101  Despite the 
player’s disability, the court found him to be sufficiently talented and 
decided that his inclusion on the football team would not require CU to 
lower its participation standards.102  Implicit in the court’s reasoning was 
the idea that CU’s clearance policy was not paramount to preserving the 
integrity of CU’s football program.103  Consequently, the policy did not 
trump the player’s disability rights.104  In fact, as later held by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the ADA and the Rehab Act preempt 
inconsistent institutional bylaws when necessary to effectuate the Acts’ 
reasonable accommodation provisions.105  Therefore, a university’s desire 
to execute an internal policy does not excuse it from compliance with the 
ADA and the Rehab Act when the two mandates conflict.106 
iii.  Inadequate Accommodation 
In cases like Class v. Towson, universities frequently argue that a 
disabled athlete’s proposed accommodation is unreasonable because it 
                                                           
46, at 163 (“[S]porting organizations should be prepared to explain the purpose of their eligibility 
requirements and rules of competition, to articulate the connection between the requirements and 
purpose, and to evaluate on an individual basis whether modification of such rules can be made 
without undermining this legitimate purpose or fundamentally altering the nature of the game.”). 
100. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793–94. 
101. Id. at 795; see also Shepherd, supra note 68, at 170–71 (noting cases wherein relief 
was granted to visually impaired athletes barred from competition by their respective 
universities). 
102. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. Mary Jo. C. v. N.Y. State & Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 163 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
106. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 849; see Brief of Appellee at 15, Class v. Towson Univ., 
806 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB). 
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would not enable the athlete to meet essential eligibility requirements or 
perform functions necessary for full participation in team activities.107  
Frequently, the crux of this argument is that the proposed accommodation 
cannot eliminate direct threats to the disabled athlete’s safety.108 
The ADA defines a “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the health 
or safety of [a disabled athlete] that cannot be eliminated [or reduced] by 
reasonable accommodation.”109  Accordingly, a university does not violate 
the ADA or the Rehab Act when its decision to exclude a disabled athlete 
is based on an accurate conclusion that the athlete’s participation will 
directly threaten the athlete’s safety.110  However, federal regulations 
regarding enforcement of the ADA and the Rehab Act state: 
In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to [his 
or her] health or safety . . ., a public entity must make an 
individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that 
relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available 
objective evidence, to ascertain:  the nature, duration, and 
severity of the risk; [and] the probability that the potential injury 
will actually occur.111 
In assessing the abovementioned factors, a university should consider 
recommendations from medical experts who have direct knowledge of the 
disabled athlete as well as the opinions of specialists who have expertise in 
dealing with the athlete’s disability.112  Only after such a detailed inquiry is 
                                                           
107. See generally Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d 833; Wright, 520 F. Supp. 789; Knapp, 942 F. 
Supp. 1191; Poole, 490 F. Supp. 948; Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. 1387. 
108. See Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1389; Class, 806 F.3d at 241–42; Knapp, 101 F.3d at 
477–78. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); see also 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(r) (2017); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (holding that under the ADA, the direct threat defense applies to 
the direct threat to others and to the individual him/herself). 
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)–(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2). 
111. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b) (2017) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (“In 
determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered 
include:  (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The 
likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm”); see 
also Chevron U.S.A., 536 U.S. at 86 (2002); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 622, 649 (1998). 
112. Jonathan R. Mook, Circuit Courts Address Who Is “Qualified” under the ADA, 2016 
LAB. & EMP. EMERGING ISSUES 7426 (May 12, 2016) (citing 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(r)). 
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conducted might an institution be justified in excluding an athlete under the 
direct threat provision.113  Furthermore, exclusion remains unlawful if this 
inquiry reveals that risks posed by the disabled athlete’s participation are 
speculative or remote.114  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
clarified this point, stating:  “Any [dis]qualification based on the risk of 
future injury must be examined with special care if the Rehabilitation Act 
[or the ADA] is not to be circumvented easily, since almost all handicapped 
persons are at a greater risk . . . [of injury] . . . .”115  Thus, “an elevated risk 
of injury, without more, is [in]sufficient to justify the refusal to hire an 
otherwise qualified handicapped person.”116 
Alone, findings of elevated risk are insufficient to justify exclusion 
because they do not satisfy the “likelihood of substantial harm” standard 
mandated by the ADA and the Rehab Act.117  That is not to say that such 
findings will not compel a team physician to recommend exclusion or give 
universities a rational basis for barring a disabled athlete from 
competition.118  However, the ADA and the Rehab Act “require[] more 
than merely a rational basis for discriminating against a handicapped 
athlete.”119  Renowned sports law attorney Eldon L. Ham best articulated 
this concept as follows:  
                                                           
113. Peter M. Spingola, Knapp v. Northwestern University:  The Seventh Circuit Slam 
Dunks the Rights of the Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 709, 720 (1998) (citing Chiari v. City of 
League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991)) (“An individual is not qualified . . . if there is a 
genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could injure others.”). 
114. Id. (“[E]xclusion decisions based upon fears of remote or minimal medical risks 
violate the letter and spirit of the Rehabilitation Act.”). 
115. Bentivegna v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982). 
116. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985). 
117. Ham, supra note 69, at 744 (citing Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 
418, 425 (E.D. Pa. 1982)) (“Mere possibilities, even if the perceived harm could be substantial, 
are not strong enough, for the statute, and the majority of evolving interpretations stick to the 
literal requirement that such harm be ‘likely.’”). 
118. See Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities: 
Who Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 987, 1019 (1992). 
119. Id. (first citing Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied 471 U.S. 1062 (1985); then citing Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 
1383 (10th Cir. 1981); and then citing Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1991)). 
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[A team] physician’s careful opinion may . . . [be] sound 
medically, but the physician’s job is not to interpret statutes.  
The physician’s term “extremely high risk” is not the same as an 
objective legal test which relies upon “likelihood.”  For 
example, if an individual hypothetically increases the already 
remote chance of quadriplegia . . . by an incremental amount 
[of] twenty-five percent by playing football, this may be too 
much additional risk from a sound medical point of view. 
However, from a legal . . . vantage, the resultant risk is still nil.  
Therefore, although both medical and legal risks are 
fundamentally sound for their own purposes, they are not the 
same.120 
Employing this line of reasoning, the court in Poole refused to 
dismiss the disabled wrestler’s complaint despite the school having found 
that participation in team activities posed a direct threat to the wrestler’s 
safety.121  In so holding, the court listened to competing medical testimony 
and concluded that the school had not adequately considered the best 
available objective evidence—the opinion of medical experts with direct 
knowledge of the wrestler’s disability.122  Because those experts 
determined that the risks posed by participation were grave but remote,123 a 
likelihood of substantial harm was not established, and his exclusion was 
not justified under the ADA or the Rehab Act.124   
One year after Poole, the Wright court issued a similar verdict.  
There, the court found the risk of harm to be minimal where a renowned 
ophthalmologist testified that playing football did not increase the 
likelihood of the visually impaired player suffering a significant eye 
injury.125  Consequently, Columbia’s exclusion decision, although 
“laudably evidencing [its] concern for its students,” ultimately served to 
                                                           
120. Ham, supra note 69, at 746. 
121. See Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 954; see also Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793 (citing 
Suemnick v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 4-70592 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (oral decision)). 
122. See Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 954. 
123. See id. at 953. 
124. See id. at 954. 
125. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793. 
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“derogate from the rights secured to plaintiff under [the Rehab Act].”126  
The university attempted to protect the disabled athlete, but by disregarding 
reliable medical evidence in favor of its own inexpert deliberations, it 
achieved the opposite effect.127  
A third federal court case, Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District, 
aligned with the opinions in Poole and Wright to form a triumvirate of 
cases critiquing “direct threat defenses.”128  Encountering a fact pattern 
almost identical to that in Poole, the court in Grube evaluated expert 
medical testimony and found that the plaintiff, an athlete with only one 
kidney, should be allowed to compete under the Rehab Act.129  The court 
reasoned that although the defendant’s fear of catastrophic injury was 
subjectively reasonable, the weight of medical evidence exposed the risk of 
such injury to be remote.130  Moreover, the plaintiff made a well-reasoned 
decision to compete, and endorsing his right to self-determination was in 
keeping with the spirit of the Rehab Act.131  
Taken alone, however, the right to self-determination does not 
prevent an exclusion decision rooted in objective medical evidence.132  For 
example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
upheld a school’s decision to exclude a disabled football player where 
doctors with direct knowledge of the player’s heart condition unanimously 
agreed that it was too dangerous for him to compete.133  The player’s talent, 
emotional pleas, and citation of mitigating data were outweighed by the 
doctors’ objective prognoses.134  Without any expert testimony challenging 
                                                           
126. Id. at 794. 
127. See id. 
128. See Mitten, supra note 118, at 1017–018; Grube, 550 F. Supp. 418. 
129. Grube, 550 F. Supp. at 421–24. 
130. Id. at 424, 425. 
131. See id. at 422. 
132. See Matthew J. Mitten, Sports Participation by “Handicapped” Athletes, 10 ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 15, 20 (1992). 
133. Mitten, supra note 118, at 1015 (citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 1014–015 (citations omitted); Matthew J. Mitten, Enhanced Risk of Harm to 
One’s Self as a Justification for Exclusion from Athletics, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189, 199–200 
(1998) (citations omitted). 
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these unfavorable medical assessments, the court was prudent in 
concluding that allowing the athlete to compete would invite a high risk of 
injury and substantial likelihood of significant harm.135  Consequently, the 
school’s exclusion decision did not violate the ADA or the Rehab Act.136   
IV. ANALYSIS:  CLASS V. TOWSON UNIVERSITY 
In Class v. Towson University, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit improperly reversed the district court’s decision and upheld 
Towson’s action to prohibit Class from competing as a member of the 
university’s football team.137  In so doing, the court incorrectly determined 
that medical clearance by Towson’s physician, Dr. Kari Kindschi, was an 
essential eligibility requirement.138  It also misconstrued case law and 
ignored relevant facts in finding Class’ proposed accommodation, the 
CorTemp system, unreasonable.139  Worst of all, by deferring to Kindschi’s 
“subjective good-faith” judgment, the Fourth Circuit skirted its 
responsibility to weigh medical evidence and determine whether the 
university’s decision to exclude Class was “objectively reasonable.”140  
                                                           
135. Mitten, supra note 118, at 1015 (citations omitted); see also Mitten, supra note 134, 
at 200. 
136. Mitten, supra note 118, at 1015 (citations omitted); see also Mitten, supra note 134, 
at 200. 
137. See generally Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 252–59 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wynn, 
J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 13, Class v. 
Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB); Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to 
Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW 360 (Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-to-clarify-athlete-disability-rights 
[https://perma.cc/AE7W-YMXT]. 
138. Class, 806 F.3d at 253–54 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel 
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11; see Ham, supra note 137. 
139. Class, 806 F.3d at 257–59 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel 
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11; see Ham, supra note 137. 
140. Class, 806 F.3d at 255–56 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel 
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11; see Ham, supra note 137. 
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A. Satisfaction of Towson’s Return-to-Play Policy and/or Medical 
Clearance by Dr. Kindschi Was Not an Essential Eligibility 
Requirement 
By requiring Kindschi’s clearance for eligibility, the Fourth Circuit 
implied that Towson had been sued over a non-controversial safety 
precaution.141  The court did not view Towson’s demand for in-house 
medical clearance as discrimination in disguise.142  Instead, it held that 
Towson had the authority to determine that Kindschi’s approval was 
necessary to certify eligibility for the football team.143   
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis was misguided.144  Instead of quickly 
washing its hands of the essential eligibility requirement issue, the Fourth 
Circuit should have recognized that the facts in Class v. Towson mimicked 
those in Poole.  As discussed in section (B)(1)(a) of Part III, the Poole 
court held that passing a school-administered physical exam was not 
essential to participation on the school wrestling team because the exam 
had nothing to do with the wrestler’s ability to compete.145   
Like the exam in Poole, the requirement of Kindschi’s clearance set 
an arbitrary standard based on the unfounded concern over future injury.146  
Even Judge Niemeyer, the author of the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion, 
conceded that this standard was simply “based on [Kindschi’s] feelings, not 
on any medical or scientific evidence.”147  In order to be considered an 
essential eligibility requirement under the ADA and the Rehab Act, 
Kindschi’s clearance must have (1) set a tangible benchmark of 
performance that (2) reflected directly on an athlete’s ability to compete at 
                                                           
141. Class, 806 F.3d at 246. 
142. Id. at 248. 
143. See id. at 247. 
144. See generally id. at 252–59 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel 
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137; Ham, supra note 137. 
145. Poole v. S. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 953–54 (D. N.J. 1980). 
146. See generally Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842–43 (D. Md.), rev’d, 
Class, 806 F.3d; Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, 
at 7; Ham, supra note 137. 
147. Class, 806 F.3d at 247; see also Brief of Appellee at 15, Class v. Towson Univ., 806 
F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB). 
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the requisite level.148  Had the Fourth Circuit followed this directive, it 
would have discovered that neither criterion was satisfied.   
First, it is obvious that Kindschi’s clearance set no tangible 
benchmark of performance.  Kindschi extended clearance when she felt an 
athlete was physically capable of performing; what lead her to that 
“feeling” is unknown.149  Consequently, players like Gavin Class were 
presumably unsure how they might demonstrate their readiness to compete.  
The Fourth Circuit should have recognized this confusion and held that 
requiring Kindschi’s clearance set an untenable standard, and thus could 
not be upheld as an essential eligibility requirement. 
Additionally, the requirement of Kindschi’s clearance failed the 
second criterion because her clearance was not based on whether Class 
could compete at a level on par with his teammates.  To prove otherwise, 
Kindschi would have to show that she refused to clear Class because, even 
with the implementation of CorTemp, medical evidence suggested that 
complications from his heatstroke rendered him unable to keep up with the 
team.  However, as mentioned previously, the record is devoid of such 
evidence.150  Judge Wynn highlighted this point in his dissenting opinion: 
“Dr. Kindschi did not point to any medical evidence supporting her 
decision . . . .”151  In fact, “Towson offered no testimony from anyone with 
expertise in heat stroke . . . [because] [Kindschi] was aware of no medical 
research that supported her [decision to exclude Class from 
competition].”152   
The facts demonstrate that Class was capable of matching the skill 
and intensity of his teammates.153  For example, both Dr. Casa and Dr. 
                                                           
148. See Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 953. 
149. See Class, 806 F.3d at 247. 
150. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, 
at 6–8; see Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841–43. 
151. Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
152. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 7; 
see Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841–43; Brief of Appellee, supra note 147, at 22–23 (“Towson . . . 
has offered no legitimate, non-discriminatory reason not to follow the June 2015 [Korey Stringer 
Institute] report’s recommendations (for which Towson paid), reflecting that Class aced a 
rigorous testing regimen designed to mimic the physical intensity of a football linesman.”). 
153. See generally Class, 806 F.3d at 252; Ham, supra note 137; ESPN Edit Operations, 
Outside the Lines: Gavin Class, VIMEO (2015), https://vimeo.com/141587564 
[http://perma.cc/N7TC-SLGV]. 
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Barth categorically confirmed that there was no medical reason why Class 
should not be able to play football.154  Moreover, Judge Wynn noted that 
the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion “ben[t] key aspects of the factual 
record” and “mischaracterize[d] the results of heat-tolerance testing” to 
support its holding in favor of Towson.155  An impartial assessment of the 
facts would have revealed that requiring Kindschi’s clearance set an 
arbitrary standard unrelated to Class’ ability to run, block, or perform any 
other function integral to competing on the same level as his teammates.  
Simply put, obtaining Kindschi’s clearance was not an essential eligibility 
requirement, and Towson’s insistence otherwise constituted the type of 
paternalistic behavior outlawed by the Rehab Act and the ADA.156   
B. Implementation of the CorTemp System Was a Reasonable 
Accommodation 
In determining whether implementation of the CorTemp System was 
a reasonable accommodation, the Fourth Circuit correctly rejected 
Towson’s claim that implementation would saddle the university with 
undue financial or administrative burdens.157  However, the court 
subsequently erred when it found that CorTemp was nonetheless 
unreasonable because its implementation would fundamentally alter 
Towson’s football program without eliminating direct threats to Class’ 
safety.158  
1. Implementation of the CorTemp System Would Not Have 
Fundamentally Altered Towson’s Football Program 
In analyzing the “fundamental alteration” issue, the Fourth Circuit 
found that implementation of CorTemp was unreasonable because it would 
change the nature of Towson football by “impinging on the . . . discretion” 
of Dr. Kindschi and her staff.159  This sanctification of Kindschi’s judgment 
                                                           
154. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 153. 
155. Class, 806 F.3d at 257 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
156. See id. at 256–57 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Ham, supra note 137. 
157. Class, 806 F.3d at 248–49. 
158. See id. at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Ham, supra note 137. 
159. Class, 806 F.3d at 252. 
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was flawed in and of itself and will be fully addressed below.160  For now, 
it is sufficient to state that the Fourth Circuit’s finding incorrectly assumes 
that challenging Kindschi’s discretion necessarily equates to forcing 
Towson to substantially modify the standards of its football program.161 
The court erred in determining that preserving Kindschi’s medical 
authority was a fundamental goal of Towson football.162  Unlike in Davis, 
where ordering a change in curriculum would have frustrated the nursing 
school’s mission and substantially modified its standards, here undermining 
Kindschi’s discretion would have had little effect on Towson’s football 
team.163 The Fourth Circuit would have reached this conclusion by 
following the precedent set forth in Johnson and Martin, where the purpose 
of a program’s rule was examined to determine whether undermining that 
rule would fundamentally alter the program’s nature.164  Had it followed 
this approach, the court would have found that Towson’s rule—giving 
Kindschi ultimate authority to clear athletes—was enacted to comply with 
a NCAA regulation mandating that:  a team “physician’s ethical and 
professional imperative to care for the best interests of student-athletes 
trumps other university concerns or motivations.”165  The purpose of that 
regulation was to take decision-making power away from coaches, whose 
jobs made them more likely to sacrifice an injured player’s health if 
rushing that player back to action might improve on-field results.166  
In Class v. Towson, however, there was no evidence that this purpose 
would be left unfulfilled if Kindschi was stripped of her final say regarding 
                                                           
160. See Timothy G. Church & James R. Neumeister, University Control of Student-
Athletes with Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, 
25 J. C. & U. L. 105, 174–75 (1998). 
161. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, 
at 9–11. 
162. Id. 
163. Ham, supra note 137. 
164. See id. 
165. Class, 806 F.3d at 248–49; see also Church & Neumeister, supra note 160, at 173 
(citing NCAA, 1997-98 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Const. art. 2.2.3 (1997)). 
166. Eldon L. Ham, Disabled Athletes: A Last Vestige of Court Tolerated 
Discrimination?, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 741, 762 (1998); see Cathy J. Jones, College 
Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 113, 155 (1992). 
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medical clearance.167  Nothing in the record suggested that the coaching 
staff intended to put Class back on the field prematurely.  Moreover, 
Kindschi’s judgment went against Class’ best interests, considering 
heatstroke experts declared that Class was “physically able to return to [the 
team],” and could “withstand the rigors of collegiate level football.”168  The 
heatstroke experts’ certification that Class could safely return to 
competition ensured compliance with NCAA mandates for the protection 
of student-athletes.  This compliance satisfied the underlying purpose of 
Towson’s rule, which gave Kindschi the authority to clear athletes for 
competition.  Thus, there was no need to discount expert medical opinion 
in favor of Kindschi’s speculative determinations.  
Dr. Casa and his colleagues determined that allowing Class to play—
with the aid of CorTemp—would not have forced Towson to substantially 
lower its standards for safe participation.169  Hence, there was no risk that 
the university’s football program would be fundamentally altered.  
Recalling Martin, it is apparent that “[i]f an exemption from walking 
doesn’t fundamentally alter professional golf, it is inconceivable that 
CorTemp monitoring fundamentally alters [Towson] football.”170  
Therefore, by upholding Kindschi’s decision, the Fourth Circuit did not 
protect the integrity or constitution of Towson football, but instead violated 
Class’ disability rights and robbed him of his ability to make an 
inspirational comeback.171   
2. Implementation of the CorTemp System Would Have Eliminated the 
Direct Threat to Gavin Class’ Safety 
The Fourth Circuit twisted facts to fashion support for its finding that 
implementation of CorTemp did not eliminate direct threats to Gavin 
Class’ safety.172  Regrettably, the court subsequently relied on this finding 
                                                           
167. See generally Class, 806 F.3d 236; Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 848; Appellee’s 
Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11. 
168. See Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 848. 
169. See Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 
848–49. 
170. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 
10. 
171. See Ham, supra note 137. 
172. See Class, 806 F.3d at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
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to incorrectly conclude that implementation of CorTemp was 
unreasonable.173  In doing so, it wrongfully validated Dr. Kindschi’s 
conjecture and disregarded the evidentiary baseline for establishing a direct 
threat:  objective medical evidence demonstrating a likelihood of 
substantial harm.174   
A grounded interpretation of the record would have revealed that 
Class’ risk of repeat heatstroke was remote.175  However, by misconstruing 
facts, the Fourth Circuit made that risk appear imminent.176  Three pages of 
the court’s majority opinion were spent challenging the CorTemp 
thermoregulation tests that Class underwent at the Korey Singer Institute.177  
The majority meticulously critiqued the testing conditions as well as 
CorTemp’s monitoring capabilities.178  It even digressed into a discussion 
on human digestion and how an unpredictable digestive process might 
affect the efficacy of CorTemp.179  Ultimately, the court decided that 
CorTemp “could not ensure Class would not suffer from another heatstroke 
while playing,”180 and thus “the heatstroke risk really ha[d] not been 
demonstrably abated.”181  This analysis was colored by the court’s fear that 
“Class may be at an increased risk of a reoccurrence of heat stroke as a 
result of his original injury.”182  
                                                           
173. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, 
at 8–9. 
174. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b) (2017); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 
U.S. 73, 86 (2002). 
175. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, 
at 6–9; see also Class, 806 F.3d at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
176. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, 
at 6–8, 7 n.3; see also Class, 806 F.3d at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
177. Class, 806 F.3d at 248–51. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 250. 
180. Id. at 251. 
181. Id. at 249. 
182. Id. 
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Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit’s extensive critique yielded the 
wrong legal conclusion.183  The court’s fatal flaw was that its discussion 
about inadequate testing, unstable digestive processes, and increased risk of 
repeat heatstroke was mere speculation.184  Its assertion that CorTemp 
could not eliminate direct threats to Class’ safety was not supported by the 
best, most current medical evidence, as required by the ADA and the 
Rehab Act.185  Moreover, while the court’s concerns were worth noting, 
they did not suggest a likelihood of substantial harm.186  Therefore, they did 
not justify excluding Class from competition because, as discussed earlier,  
“[a] mere elevation of risk, without more, is insufficient to find that a 
disabled individual [faces a direct threat and therefore] is not ‘otherwise 
qualified’ [to compete].”187  
Had the Fourth Circuit followed the trail of objective medical 
evidence, it likely would not have held in favor of Kindschi and Towson.  
The record was rife with scientifically verifiable answers for every question 
that the court contemplated.  For example, the court was worried that 
CorTemp would not alert trainers in time for them to remove Class from 
competition should his body overheat.188  However, Dr. Casa had already 
addressed this concern by explaining that heatstroke cannot come on 
suddenly since internal body temperature generally will not rise more than 
one degree per ten minutes.189  Consequently, if team trainers properly 
                                                           
183. See Ham, supra note 137; see also ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 153. 
184. See Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
185. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b); see also Chevron U.S.A., 536 U.S. at 86. 
186. Ham, supra note 166, at 744 (citing Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. 
Supp. 418, 425 (E.D. Pa. 1982)) (“Mere possibilities, even if the perceived harm could be 
substantial, are not strong enough, for the statute, and the majority of evolving interpretations 
stick to the literal requirement that such harm be ‘likely.’”). 
187. Peter M. Spingola, Knapp v. Northwestern University:  The Seventh Circuit Slam 
Dunks the Rights of the Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 709, 720 (1998) (paraphrasing Mantolete 
v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
188. Class, 806 F.3d at 251. 
189. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 8; 
Transcript of Record at 104–06., Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB). 
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monitored Class’ CorTemp readings, “it [would be] impossible for Class 
even to approach the heatstroke ‘danger zone.’”190  
Objective medical evidence proved overwhelmingly that “the 
‘cascade of consequences’. . . feared [by the Fourth Circuit] could arise 
only by ignoring [telltale] warning signs [and CorTemp alerts].”191  In fact, 
“[i]f [Class] us[ed] the [CorTemp] system . . ., [he] would be the safest 
person on the football field because he[] [would be] the one person who 
then could not overheat during practice.”192  Although many of Dr. Casa’s 
studies did not include people with a history of heatstroke,193 the court 
seemingly ignored the dispositive fact that “there [was] no evidence in the 
record that anyone ha[d] ever suffered heatstroke while being monitored 
with the CorTemp system, which is used by numerous universities and 
NFL teams.”194  Had the Fourth Circuit resisted its paternalistic urge to 
insulate Class, it would have accepted these facts and resolved that the 
implementation of CorTemp eliminated any direct threat to Class’ safety.  
Instead, the majority was paralyzed by fear and rendered a decision that 
violated Class’ disability rights.  
C. The Fourth Circuit Applied the Wrong Standards of Analysis in 
Determining that Towson’s Decision to Exclude Class Was Reasonable 
While the Fourth Circuit’s mischaracterization of the record is 
inexcusable, it committed its most egregious error by determining that 
courts need not adjudicate competing interpretations of medical evidence 
when evaluating a university’s decision to exclude a disabled athlete.195  
The court stated:  
[T]he standard for assessing Dr. Kindschi’s judgment not to 
clear Class for return to football under Towson University’s 
                                                           
190. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 8 
(citation omitted). 
191. Id. (citation omitted). 
192. Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
193. See Transcript of Record, supra note 189, at 121. 
194. Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
195. See id. at 251. 
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Return-to-Play Policy is not whether we share that judgment or 
whether she had a better judgment than some other doctor.  
Rather, the standard is whether her judgment was reasonable 
. . . .196  And in resolving this question, we give the Team 
Physician’s decision—and derivatively, Towson University’s 
decision—a measure of deference. . . .197  Stated otherwise, in 
evaluating reasonableness, we must determine whether the Team 
Physician’s decision and, derivatively, Towson University’s 
decision . . . was a good-faith application of its policy to protect 
the health and safety of student-athletes.198 
The court thus declared itself to be Kindschi’s defender:  her 
decisions were to be respected if they related to the goal of ensuring Class’ 
safety.  Likewise, where Kindschi’s judgment reflected a good-faith 
concern for Class’ welfare, it was to be shielded from the onslaught of 
damning medical evidence.  Under Knapp, so said the Fourth Circuit, 
courts presiding over athlete disability cases were auditors of subjective 
intent, not triers of fact.199   
However, this reasoning was an affront to the purpose of the ADA 
and “the Rehabilitation Act:  ‘to permit handicapped individuals to live life 
as fully as they are able, without paternalistic authorities deciding that 
certain activities are too risky for them.’”200  Far from recommending 
deference to a university accused of violating an athlete’s disability rights, 
the Acts demand that courts initiate a de novo review of the university’s 
judgment in light of the best available objective medical evidence.201  The 
court must act as an unbiased fact-finder because: 
                                                           
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 247 (citations omitted). 
198. Id. 
199. See Id. at 251. 
200. Dana A. Rice, Seventh Circuit Misses Jumper:  Fails to Protect Disabled Student 
Athletes Knapp v. Northwestern University, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 84, 85 
(2003) (quoting Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 953–54). 
201. See Spingola, supra note 187, at 740–41 (“[T]he Supreme Court, as stated above, has 
required courts to make an independent assessment as to the legitimacy of a [university’s] 
concerns.  The Arline court squarely placed the responsibility for making an individualized 
inquiry, making findings of fact, and giving appropriate weight to the competing concerns of 
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[D]eferring to one party’s [judgment] contradicts the intent of 
the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ideal process of 
justice, where parties argue and judges judge. If these Acts have 
any teeth, a court, not the excluding party, must fairly determine 
whether exclusion [of a disabled athlete] is warranted.202  In 
recognition of this, Congress specifically named colleges and 
universities as possible violators of the ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act.203  Therefore, Congress most likely did not intend courts to 
defer to a college or university’s own judgment.204  Though it 
may be difficult to adjudicate a battle between [competing 
medical opinions], it simply is bad policy for a court to defer to 
one party’s reasoning in a proceeding. . . .205  Rather, 
determinations are to be made based on an objective view, 
presumably one which would take into account views of both 
parties.206   
The presiding district court judge in Knapp appreciated these 
principles:  
I must consider the testimony of all experts who testified and 
determine which are most persuasive.  It is what the trial of 
disputes such as this will sometimes require. It might have been 
better to have left the choice to a panel of physicians, but 
Congress left it with the courts.207 
                                                           
[universities] and disabled individuals on the courts, not on [universities] seeking to bar disabled 
persons from participation in their services or programs.”). 
202. Church & Neumeister, supra note 160, at 175 (emphasis added) (citing Martin v. 
PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1247–48 (D. Or. 1998)). 
203. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(B), 12181(7)(J) (1994)); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A) 
(1998)). 
204. Id. (emphasis added). 
205. Id. (citing Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1119–20 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
206. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 623 (1998)). 
207. Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (N.D. Ill.), rev’d, Knapp v. Nw. 
Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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However, when Knapp reached the Seventh Circuit, the bench 
became infected by “an extraordinary ‘in loco parentis’ mindset” which 
facilitated the court’s counterintuitive conclusion that defendants were 
owed deference in disability rights cases.208  Employing this faulty 
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit refused to weigh competing medical 
evidence and upheld NU’s decision to exclude Nicholas Knapp from 
competition.209  Universities, said the court, are best situated to make 
medical determinations regarding disabled athletes.210  Should those 
determinations be litigated, a court’s only job is to ensure that the accused 
university was motivated by a concern for student-athlete welfare.211  
Furthermore, because courts were in an inferior position to make medical 
determinations, the judiciary need not concern itself with evidence 
exposing universities’ concerns to be speculative or paternalistic.212 
This radically unsound thinking created a circuit split213 by ignoring 
the ADA and the Rehab Act’s mandate for substantive review of a 
university’s decision to exclude a disabled athlete.214  Moreover, by 
inexplicably shielding Northwestern’s judgment from judicial scrutiny, the 
Seventh Circuit “create[d] an irrebutable presumption” in favor of 
universities accused of violating an athlete’s disability rights.215  Under 
Knapp, courts could overturn a university’s exclusion decision only in the 
exceedingly rare case where that decision was made in subjective bad 
                                                           
208. Ham, supra note 166, at 743. 
209. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484–85. 
210. Id. at 484. 
211. See id. at 484–85. 
212. See id. 
213. Regarding the “otherwise qualified” issue:  the Seventh Circuit in Knapp, 101 F.3d 
473, and the Fourth Circuit in Class, 806 F.3d 236, delivered holdings that conflicted with those 
issued in Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1993) and Pushkin v. Regents of 
Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981). 
214. See Spingola, supra note 187, at 730; Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987). 
215. See Spingola, supra note 187, at 730. See generally Brief of Appellee, supra note 
147, at 45 (“Towson’s argument that Class is not otherwise qualified because the team doctor did 
not clear him to play is a tautology.”). 
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faith.216  Therefore, as a practical matter, athletes like Class could not win 
in the Seventh Circuit.217 
Sadly, by following this bad precedent, the Fourth Circuit in Class v. 
Towson discounted a large catalog of contrary case law218 and evaded its 
congressionally imposed duty to objectively analyze evidence when 
determining whether Towson’s decision to exclude Class was lawful.219  
The court should have conducted an impartial review of the record and 
decided that the medical opinions of heatstroke experts were more 
persuasive than Dr. Kindschi’s paternalistic presumptions.  Instead, the 
majority punted and delivered a deferring opinion that bound Class to the 
will of Towson—the very entity accused of violating his rights.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Congressional mandates set forth in the ADA and Rehab Act require 
the legal community to reject the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Class v. 
Towson.  The majority opinion is clever, but polluted by the “Hank Gathers 
Effect,”220 a phenomenon where fear of catastrophic injury precipitates the 
suppression of a disabled athlete’s rights.221  While this Comment does not 
                                                           
216. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, 
at 12. 
217. See generally id. 
218. See generally Arline, 480 U.S. at 287; PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 622 (1998). 
219. See Church & Neumeister, supra note 160, at 175. 
220. Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW 360 
(Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-to-clarify-
athlete-disability-rights [https://perma.cc/FEZ4-8SMJ]. 
221. See Ham, supra note 166 at 760–62 (1998) (suggesting that the highly publicized 
incident where Loyola Marymount University basketball star Hank Gathers died on the court has 
led to an undercurrent of paternalism in subsequent disability rights cases).  Recalling Gathers’ 
untimely death and Loyola Marymount’s resulting public relations nightmare, universities have 
improperly decided that violating the ADA and the Rehab Act is sometimes necessary to prevent 
similar tragedy and protect the university’s reputation.  However, these universities neglect to 
consider that Gathers’ death was, in large part, caused by Loyola Marymount’s failure to adhere 
to the initial prescribed dosage of Gathers’ medication (the accommodation)—which would have 
allowed Gathers to safely compete despite his heart condition.  Furthermore, to improve on-court 
results, Loyola Marymount’s coaching staff had rushed Gathers back to competition despite 
unmistakable evidence that his return was premature.  See id. 
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suggest that the court should be condemned for attempting to ensure Class’ 
safety, it does ask the reader to evaluate the record and conclude that the 
court’s concerns were not supported by substantial medical evidence.  
Therefore, such concerns did not justify the Fourth Circuit’s delivery of an 
opinion that spurned the ADA and the Rehab Act by implying that certain 
activities were too risky for a disabled person. 
The Fourth Circuit was consumed by thoughts of an improbable 
development—that Class’ return would result in tragedy—a fascination 
that ultimately led the court to fixate on a sliver of distorted precedent 
despite overwhelmingly contradictory case law.222  Had the court resisted 
the emotional pull of this doomsday scenario, it would have held that Class 
was “otherwise qualified” to compete.  Instead, the court’s focus on fear 
drove it away from the law and plunged it into a meandering rationalization 
of its decision to abdicate authority in favor of Kindschi’s subjective 
judgment.  
Courts must learn from the Fourth Circuit’s mistakes if the integrity 
of federal disability law is to be upheld.  The sad result of Class v. Towson 
should show courts that disabled athletes need protection, not from 
themselves, but from paternalistic universities keen on disregarding the 
ADA and the Rehab Act when compliance is inconvenient.  Most 
importantly, when evaluating a university’s exclusion decision, courts 
should recall Class’ denied dream223 and demand that the decision be 
supported by the best available objective medical evidence, not merely by 
subjective guesswork. 
 
                                                           
222. The court should have considered that, because Class was willing to sign a liability 
waiver, Towson would be insulated from legal consequences in the extremely unlikely event that 
Class’ return resulted in catastrophic injury. Class’ waiver would be binding because he had equal 
bargaining power and was sufficiently informed about the risks of returning to play.  See Cathy J. 
Jones, College Athletes:  Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 
113, 142–43, 210 (1992). 
223. Despite being denied of his dreams to return to Division I football, Class—as a 
testament to his character and physical well-being—is now a top competitor in the World 
Transplant Games where he won five medals in 2016. See Gavin Class Overcomes Incredible 
Odds and Returns to Competitive Athletics, CBS BALT. (June 30, 2016, 8:53 AM), 
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/30/former-towson-football-player-gavin-class-overcomes-
incredible-odds-and-returns-to-competitive-athletics [https://perma.cc/67TA-998T]; see also Jake 
Lourim, Towson’s Gavin Class Recovers from End of Football Journey to Find ‘Enlightening’ 
Opportunity at Transplant Games, BALT. SUN (June 26, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/outdoors/bs-sp-outdoors-gavin-class-transplant-games-
0626-20160624-story.html [http://archive.is/DpxTB]. 
